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Jevons's Applications of Utilitarian 
Theory to Economic Policy* 
SANDRA J. PEART 
College of William and Mary 
I 
, 
The precise nature ofW. S. Jevons's utilitarianism as a guiding rule for 
economic policy has yet to be investigated, and that will be the first 
issue treated in this paper. While J. A. Schumpeter, for instance, 
asserted that 'some of the most prominent exponents of marginal 
utility' (including Jevons), were 'convinced utilitarians', he did not 
investigate the further implications for Jevons's policy analysis. 1 
Moreover, Jevons's writings on economic policy are strikingly 
similar to those of J. S. Mill, yet mostly overlooked. I shall demonstrate 
the remarkable degree of common ground between_Jevons and Mill on 
policy issues, a matter formally recognized, as I shall show, by Jevons 
himself. ;rt emerges that Jevons's policy writings, like those of Mill, 
must be understood in the context of a wide-ranging programme for 
social reform. Jevons and Mill shared an intense desire to correct 
perceived social and economic injustices, as well as a common method 
of weighing predicted benefits and costs in the light of their overall 
goal of social reform. These goals largely coincided. For both, the 
primary welfare problem was what Jevons termed the 'deep and almost 
hopeless poverty in the mass of people', a problem which was to be 
• I would like to thank Professors S. Hollander of the University of Toronto, and Craig 
Heinicke at the College of William and Mary, members of the History of Economic 
Thought Workshop at the University of Toronto, participants in the History of Eco-
nomics Society 1989 annual meetings, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments at 
earlier stages of this research, as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada for financial support. 1 ; 
1 History of Economic Analysis, New York, 1954, p. 1056; cf. p. 408. R. D. C. Black has 
noted that Jevons's utilitarianism has been neglected. He argues that while the greatest 
happiness principle-a 'social principle'-was not important to the Theory of Political 
Economy (henceforth TPE), the 'principle of utility', or theory of pleasure and pain, was 
integral to that work. Cf. 'Jevons, Bentham and DeMorgan', Economica, xxxix (1972), 
125--7, and 'William Stanley Jevons', The New Palgrave,-ed. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and 
P. Newman, 3 vols., London, 1987, ii. 1012-13. J. Spengler argues, without elaboration, 
that Jevons's examination of the role of the state evinced empiricism and utilitarianism. 
See 'The Marginal Revolution and Concern with Economic Growth', History of Political 
Economy, iv (1972), 480-1. But in 'Jevons and his Precursors', Econometrica, xix (1951), 
233-4, R. Robertson suggested that the TPE provides evidence that Jevons 'subtly 
rejected' Benthamite utilitarianism. In T. W. Hutchison's discussion of Jevons on policy, 
there is no mention of utilitarianism (On Revolutions and ProgPess in Economic 
Knowledge (henceforth On Revo{utions), Cambridge, 1978, pp. 96-102). 
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corrected by a variety of policies designed to encourage self-improve-
ment on the part of labourers. 'Improvement' encompassed the achieve-
ment of intellectual, moral and economic independence; intervention 
was justified if it forwarded this goal providing always that the 
(expected) costs of intervention did not outweigh the (expected) bene-
fits of improvement. 
My examination controverts the recent evaluation by T. W. Hutch-
ison, who has argued that 'around 1870' there occurred 'a major 
turning-point in economic policy' linked to Jevons's theoretical 
innovations in economics. It is 'surely not entirely coincidental' (runs 
this evaluation) that the policy revolution occurred in Britain where 
'central Ricardo-Mill theories of value and distribution' were being 
challenged by 1870. More specifically, it is the rejection of the natural 
-wage theory that Hutchison claims 'opened up the whole question of 
poverty and social reform', while 'the utiiity concept and the principle 
of diminishing marginal utility ... fostered ideas about redistribution 
and progressive taxation in England'.2 An emerging concern with 
unemployment is also linked to the theoretical developments. 
Hutchison argues further that a new 'cautious' and 'empiricist' 
policy stance and methodology emerged 'somewhere about 1870' (pp. 
94, 95). Here he poi:i;its to the abandonment of the 'sweeping application 
of laissez-faire principles', with Jevons envisaged as 'if not a "revolu-
tionary", at least a transitional figure', who appreciated that the issue 
of intervention must be decided on a case-by-case basis, by 'empirical 
examination' (pp. 96, 97).3 In short, 
It is for its magnificently eloquent, often-quoted statements of an empirical, 
experimental anti-apriori approach to policy questions that Jevons's The State 
in Relation to Labour is famous. Jevons indeed is a forerunner of Sir Karl 
Popper both in his conception of scientific method in his Principles of Science 
and consequently also in his advocacy of empirical, piecemeal social experi-
mentation (p. 101). 
The implication of this claim is that Jevons's approach to policy was 
fundamentally different from that of his predecessors, Jevons being 
' On Revolutions, pp. 62, 97, 92--3. M. Blaug has argued that there was continuity 
between neoclassical and classical economic policy analysis, marginal utility theory 
being 'largely irrelevant' to economic policy. See 'Was There a Marginal Revolution?', 
History of Political Economy, iv (1972), 269, 279. I agree that there was continuity; but, as 
far as concerns Jevons and Mill, this must be explained in terms of a common 
interpretation of the utilitarian principle. 
3 Elsewhere Hutchison writes that Jevons was 'fundamentally and philosophically' 
anti-dogmatic, having abandoned his early 'thoroughgoing free-market view' ('The 
Politics and Philosophy in Jevons's Political Economy', Manchester School, 1 (1982), 376). 
Jevons's policy analysis itself is said to have undergone a transition between 1857 and 
1882. This matter I take up below. E. Paul also concludes that Jevons abandoned laissez. 
faire doctrine, but recognizes that he was close to Mill methodologically. See 'Jevons: 
Economic Revolutionary, Political Utilitarian', Journal of the History of Ideas, xl (1979), 
278. 
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more realistically attuned than they to the needs of his country and the 
abilities of policy makers. In his 'later years' he is said to have 
possessed a realistic insight into the nature of economic knowledge and of its 
application to the problems of economic policy-making which has not been 
equalled by any other comparable group of economists, and was certainly far 
superior to that of [his] Ricardian predecessors with their comparisons with 
Newton, Euclid and the law of physics (p. 120; see also The Politics and 
Philosophy of Economics, New York, 1981, p. 39). 
While Mill's article, 'Leslie on the Land Question' (1870), was, he 
allows, characterized by 'less rigid, Ricardian, deductive absolutism', 
Hutchison asserts that this 'relativism does not otherwise figure at all 
strongly or prominently elsewhere in the Principles or in the essay on 
Definition and Method' (p. 63).4 
Vin~ent Bladen in his account of the period also points to a decline 
of the laissez-faire doctrine and increased 'realism' of professional 
economists by 1870. Economists from Adam Smith to J. S. Mill are said 
to have been 'so impressed with the possibility of the automatic 
functioning of the economic system that they preached the doctrine of 
laissez-faire' reducing 'the agenda of government ... to a minimum'; 
whereas there is discernible a 'collectivist trend in legislation' in the 
writings of professional economists by 1870-including, conspicuously, 
Jevons.5 In this account, throughout the late nineteenth century 
economists gained a new and realistic appreciation of the ·complexities 
of the economic system, a responsible attitude towards policy analysis, 
and a 'diminished faith in a priori reasoning': 
Economists became more careful in applying theory, valid under certain 
postulated conditions of great simplicity, to the problems of the real world, and 
more sensitive to those changes in the characteristics of the real world which 
undermined views of public policy which had been well founded in the 
conditions of an earlier time (p. 309; cf. pp. 303--8). 
The increased calls for intervention, it is asserted, reflected altered 
economic conditions rather than developments in economic theory (p. 
306). 
As remarked" earlier, it is my contention that Jevons and Mill shared 
a common method as well as a common set of value-judgements 
defining 'the greatest good'. Both saw a role for intervention, but one. 
• This position Hutchison subsequently modified by a concession that Mill's methodo-
logical shift occurred in the last eight years of his life (rather than the five years posited 
in his book), and that relativism does not figure very (instead of 'at all') strongly ('On 
JSM's,Defence ofRicardian Economics', Open Letter to S. Hollander, Birmingham, 1981, 
p. 3). 
• An Introduction to Political Economy, Toronto, 1959, pp. 302, 303. Black, too, suggests 
that there was a trend in social and economic policy making 'from a more individualistic 
to a more collectivist approach ... with public opinion coming to question the estab-
lished Victorian values of self-help and independence' ('Transitions in Political Econ-
omy', Manchester Special Lectures (unpublished typescript), 1982, pp. 7, 13). 
284 Sandra J. Peart 
which took account of individual initiative, and aimed at encouraging 
'self-reliance'. For both, utilitarianism entailed a presumption in 
favour of encouraging independent and responsible behaviour, and 
liberty constituted a key element in the utilitarian goal.6 
The paper proceeds as follows. I outline first Jevons's conception of 
utilitarianism, and proceed in section III to the~application of utilit-
arian rules to policy analysis. Section IV focuses specifically on his 
analysis of trade unions and co-operation, where his vision of a 
reformed society peopled by self-reliant labourers is most striking. The 
extraordinary similarity between Mill and Jevons methodologically, in 
the choice of policy goals, and in the analysis of specified policy issues 
is demonstrated in section V. Jevons's intellectual debt to Mill is 
investigated in section VI. Finally, I turn to the implication of my 
analysis concerning the relationship between theory and policy, as 
well as the purported policy break of 1870. 
II 
It is an essential feature of Jevons's utilitarian perspective that 
policy was not to be based on a theory of 'abstract rights'. In 1867 he 
offered this 'strong opinion': 
no abstract principle, and no absolute rule, can guide us in determining what 
kinds of industrial enterprise the State should undertake, and what it should 
not .... Nothing but experience and argument from experience can in most 
cases determine whether the community will be best served by its collective 
state action, or by trusting to private self-interest (Methods of Social Reform 
and Other Papers, London, 1883, p. 278).7 
Jevons reiterated this argument in 'Experimental Legislation' (MSR, 
1880, p. 275) and in 1882, when again he denied the existence of 
'abstract rights, absolute principles, indefeasible laws, inalterable 
rules, or anything whatever of an eternal and inflexible nature' in 
social affairs (The State in Relation to Labour, (henceforth SRL), 
London, 1887, p. 6; cf. pp. 16, 9). 
Further, from at least 1871, Jevons's approach to legislation was 
cautious, and appreciative of the fact that policy must take public 
opinion into account: 'The Government cannot always engage to teach 
people what is best for them, and ... we must pay some attention to the 
6 I agree with Hutchison's evaluation concerning Jevons's method, and policy goals. 
But I add to his analysis by demonstrating Jevons's utilitarianism and its near identity 
with that of Mill. Jevons emerges from my examination as more conservative and less 
willing to call for intervention than J. S. Mill. This supports Hutchison's argument that 
Jevons was 'cautious', but refutes his position that it was Jevons who ended the 
'sweeping' adherence to laissez-faire. 
7 For convenience, references to works published in Methods of Social Reform (MSR), 
Investigations in Currency and Finance (!CF), as well as The Principles of Economics 
(PE), are referred to by the volume in which the piece was published (MSR, !CF, or PE), 
followed by the original date of publication. 
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most unreasoning prejudices' (The Principles of Economics and Other 
Papers, London, 1905, p. 223). Five years later he suggested that 
'Compromise is of the very essence oflegislative change, and as society 
becomes more diverse and complicated, compromise becomes more and 
more indispensable' (MSR, 1876, p. 24 7). And in 1880 he stressed the 
limitations which popular opinion placed on policy matters, so that 
while parliament might 'to a certain extent, guide, or at any rate 
restrain, the conduct of its subjects', its 'powers' were 'very limited' 
and 'a law which does not command the consent of the body of the 
people must soon be repealed ... ' (MSR, 1880, p. 261; cf. SRL, p. 20). 
In 1880 Jevons warned against (untested) wide-ranging legislative 
reform, this indeed being the 'main point' of 'Experimental Legislation' 
(MSR, p. 275). Whenever possible, legislators 'should observe the order 
of nature, and proceed tentatively' since major legislative interven-
tions might entail 'catastrophic' disturbances of the orderly process of 
'social growth': 
Changes effected by any important Act of Parliament are like earthquakes and 
cataclysms, which disturb the continuous course of social growth. They effect 
revolutionary rather than habitual changes. Sometimes they do much good; 
sometimes much harm; but in any case it is hardly possible to forecast the 
result of a considerable catastrophic change in the social organism (p. 256). 
In short, Parliament 'must give up the pretension that it can enact 
the creation of certain social institutions to be carried on as specified 
in the "hereinafter contained" clauses', being at any rate 'almost 
powerless' to create institutions (p. 261). Since the imposition of a 
'sudden general' law was costly while affording 'no clear means of 
distinguishing its effects from the general resultant of social and 
industrial progress' (pp. 264-5), Jevons recommended that legislation 
be gradual and partial.8 
In sum, legislation was 'not a science at all' but rather a matter of 
'practical work, creating human institutions', akin to the craft of 
shipbuilding (SRL, pp. 7, 9). Sciences founded upon 'general principles 
of nature', such as ethics, economics, and jurisprudence, 'assist in the 
work of legislation' just as physical sciences 'instruct us in the making 
of a ship'. Jevons ascribed a complex synthesizing task to the legis-
lator, involving 'use of any science, or of all sciences which have any 
bearing upon the matter' (p.,28). Legislation was to be approached in an 
'all-round manner', the legislator being 
neither chemist, nor physicist, nor physician, nor economist, nor moralist, but 
all these things in some degree, and something more as well, in the sense that 
he must gather to a focus the complex calculus of probabilities, the data of 
which are supplied by the separate investigations (p. 29). 
8 Elsewhere Jevons argued that fenced machinery might 'palpably' prevent industrial 
accidents; yet the observed outcome was complicated by possible altered behaviour 
patterns, a moral hazard problem (SRL, p. 27). 
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'The greatest good of the greatest number' was the criterion for 
evaluating these probabilities. Against his caution, Jevons balanced a 
reformist attitude: 'no sociaLtransformation would be too great to be 
commended and attempted', provided that 'it could be clearly shown to 
lead to the greater happiness of the community', that is assuming 
'scientific evidence of [its] practicability and good tendency' (SRL, p. 
11). Thus 
the State is justified in passing any law, or even in doing any single act which 
without ulterior consequences, adds to the sum total of happiness. Good done 
is sufficient justification of any act, in the absence of evidence that ·equal or 
greater evil will subsequently follow (p. 12). 
The evaluation of any act of government entailed a judgment 
concerning 'the balance of good or evil which it produces'; this of 
course constituting the 'outcome of the Benthamist doctrine' (p. 17). 
Interpersonal and intertemporal weighing of the net balance was 
required: 'It is not sufficient to show by direct experiment or other 
incontestable evidence that an addition of happiness is made. We must 
also assure ourselves that there is no equivalent or greater subtraction 
of hai;>piness,-a subtraction which may take effect either as regards 
other people or subsequent times' (p. 28). While he recognized that a 
policy such as a tax on matches would impose hardship upon labourers 
in the industry as a result of a fall in demand for their product, Jevons 
stressed the short run nature of this hardship, and concluded that 'It is 
the law of nature and the law of society that the few must yield to the 
good of the many' (a reference to those citizens outside the industry 
who benefit from the imposition of a sound tax), 'provided that there is 
a clear and very considerable balance of advantage to the whole 
community' (PE, 1871, p. 221).9 
In principle, no group or person was to receive special trel:!,tment in 
the comparisons of 'happiness': the Factory Acts received high praise 
for being 'disinterested legislation' treating of 'the health and welfare 
of the people at large' (p. 52; cf. p. 53). Taxation, also, was to impinge 
equally upon citizens. 
But what, precisely, did the notion of 'happiness' entail? Jevons 
suggested in the Theory of Political Economy that prices might be used 
to measure 'utility' (p. 12), but recognized the narrow focus entailed by 
this procedure: 
~ 
It is the lowest rank of feelings which we here treat. The calculus of utility , 
aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour .... A 
higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to show how he may 
9 It is a defect of his argument, that Jevons did not raise the issue of compensation. To 
my knowledge the only mention of compensation occurs in A Serious Fall (1863), where 
he argued that since the government never decreed gold as a 'real standard of value', it 
was not obliged to compensate those who lost following an inflation (!CF, pp. 94-5). 
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best employ that wealth for the good of others as well as himself. But when that 
higher calculus gives no prohibition, we need the lower calculus to gain us the 
utmost good in matters of moral indifference (p. 27). 
Insistence upon a broad perspective emerges when Jevons turned to 
policy as such. In The State in Relation to Labour he suggested that 
policy makers who sought general happiness must consider not only 
'economic' but also 'moral', 'sanitary' and 'political' probabilities (p. 
30). Thus, the evaluation of policy measures involved more than a 
simple-minded observation of prices.10 
In a review of Utilitarianism published in 1879 Jevons conceded 
Mill's case that pleasures ranged from 'high' to 'low'. Yet he argued in 
opposition to Mill, that pleasures might be ranked 'high' or 'low' 
according to Benthamite measures of their 'length, intensity, cer-
tainty, fruitfulness, purity and extent' (to large numbers ofpeople). 11 A 
comparison of policies would then reveal which contributed most to 
.overall happiness. Thus 'after the model of inquiry given by Bentham, 
[we may] resolve into its elements the effect of one action and the other 
upon the happiness of the community'. 
But two problems remained. Even if all persons are treated the same 
in this comparison (and there is reason to doubt that Jevons actually 
adhered to this precept), it is by no means clear how to rank any two 
policies until a means of measuring 'intensity', 'fruitfulness', etc. for 
each person affected by the policy has been devised, and then a 
weighting scheme has been designed and justified for total pleasure, 
the (weighted) sum of each type of pleasure (summed across all 
individuals). Each (expected) outcome entailed some quantities of 
qualitatively different pleasures; Jevons implicitly regarded some 
qualities (such as length) as more important than others (such as 
intensity). Policies that might be expected to promote these more 
worthwhile types of pleasures, were, in his estimation, better than 
policies which did not. Thus he suggested, for instance, that the 
construction of a library, entailing lasting pleasure, results in 'a higher 
pleasure' than the establishment of a race course that creates intense, 
short-lived pleasure (p. 533). In short, Jevons's utilitarianism was 
intimately bound up with subjective judgments concerning the general 
10 Jevons insisted in TPE that interpersonal comparisons of utility were unnecessary 
for his theory (p. 14). In policy analysis, comparisons were called for, although Jevons 
now enlarged the notion of 'utility' to encompass much more than 'the lowest ran~ of 
feeling'. He never came up with a quantitative means to measure this 'utility'. 
11 See 'John Stuart Mill's Philosophy Tested. iv. Utilitarianism', Contemporary Re-
view, iv (1879), 533. It is my position that Jevons's differences from Mill concerning the 
procedures.for ranking pleasures were important from a philosophical standpoint, but 
did not create any marked difference in policy analysis. In practice, notwithstanding the 
key differences on the ranking of pleasures, the policy analysis and recommendations of 
Mill were similar to those of Jevons. This I account for in terms of their shared goal of 
wide-ranging social reform. 
288 Sandra J. Peart 
development of society and the amelioration of working class con-
ditions.12 
Presumably because of this concern with the labouring classes, 
Jevons's writings reveal further that in fact some groups of people were 
weighted more heavily in the utilitarian estimate of 'happiness' than 
others. As I argue below, his utilitarianism must be understood in the 
context of a wide-ranging programme for social reform, designed with 
special reference to .the labouring poor. 
It is a second inadequacy of Jevons's procedure that he provided no 
mechanism to estimate consumers' pleasures when prices are not 
allowed as indicators of happiness. And this measurement is certainly 
called for, if interpersonal trade offs of happiness are"l"equired. If there 
is no mechanism-such as prices-for making interpersonal compar-
isons of utility, it is not clear how the policy maker was to maximize 
general happiness.13 Given this inadequacy, it is not surprising that in 
1882 Jevons fully acknowledged estimates of 'utility' might differ: 'We 
cannot expect to agree in utilitarian estimates, at least without much 
debate. We must agree to differ, and though we are bound to argue 
fearlessly; it should be with the consciousness that there is room for 
wide and bona fide difference of opinion' (SRL, p. 166). 
While Jevons insisted that utilitarian policy could rely upon no 
,universal rules, he did allow a number of presumptive guidelines.14 In 
the absence of an explicit pleasure ranking system, we can infer 
something about Jevons's conception of the broad utilitarian aim from 
his policy recommendations. 
It emerges from these recommendations that utilitarianism for 
Jevons involved first and foremost the alleviation of poverty, including 
its consequences, 'vice' and 'ignorance'. In the 1865 Coal Question he 
referred to 'the poverty', and 'ignorance, improvidence, and brutish 
drunkenness of our lower working classes' which he linked to rapid 
population growth in the face of stagnating demand for agricultural 
labour, and which was to be corrected by a system of general education 
(The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation 
and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal Mines, London, 1906, pp. 
12 As L. Stephen has demonstrated, this is the case also for J. S. Mill, for whom 
utilitarianism attempts to address the issue of 'development', altering the 'elements of 
happiness itself' (The English Utilitarians, 3 vols., London, 1900, iii. 308; cf. pp. 304f and 
note 35 below). 
13 This point is reiterated by Paul, p. 283. 
14 Compare L. Robbins, who criticized Jevons for suggesting that there are no general 
criteria for intervention: 'the net effect of his discussion, is certainly to leave the 
impression that all questions of practice are completely open questions, and that there 
are no rules of any degree of generality which social science, combined with the 
Utilitarian norms, may enable us to devise' (The Evolution of-Modern Economic Theory, 
London, 1970, p. 187). 
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xlvii-xlviii). His 1870 Opening Address to the British Association for 
the Advancement of Science decried the results of over-population, 
'the deep and almost hopeless poverty in the mass of people', and 
advocated policies which would enable the labourer to become self-
sufficient (MSR, 1870, pp. 196, 197).15 In 1878 Jevons called for wide--
ranging social reform to eliminate poverty: 'If the citadel of poverty 
and ignorance and vice is to be taken at all, it must be besieged from 
every point of the compass-from below, from above, from within; and 
no kind of aim must be neglected which will tend to secure the ultimate 
victory of morality and culture' (MSR, 1878, p. 2). 
Since 'happiness mainly consists in unimpeded and successful ener-
g~sing', liberty constituted a second major component of Jevons's 
utilitarian goal, being envisaged as both a basic requisite to happiness, 
and means to achieving it-that is, 'a prime element in happiness', and 
also 'the necessary condition of that free development from which all 
our social blessings arise' (SRL, p. 5). Each 'needless check or lim-
itation of action' was thus considered as 'so much destruction of 
pleasurable energy, or chance of such' (p. 13). 
At the same time man is a social being, and consequently 'cannot 
enjoy the society of other men without constantly coming into conflict 
with them'; the 'mere fact of society existing obliges us to admit the 
necessity of laws, not designed, indeed, to limit the freedom of any one 
person, except so far as this limitation tends on the whole to the 
greater average freedom of all' (p. 14). Here interpersonal trade offs 
were the norm; yet since liberty ranked highly as a pleasure, Jevons 
was inclined to argue that 'a heavy burden of proof' was required in 
order to show that a liberty-reducing intervention was warranted. 
Although there is 'on the whole, a certain considerable probability 
that individuals will find out for themselves the best paths in life, and 
will be eventually the best citizens when left at liberty to their own 
course' (MSR, 1882, p. 176), if evidence reveals exceptional cases to the 
cont'°ary, intervention is justified. While 'more general considerations 
lead us to look upon freedom as the normal state', Jevons suggested 
that the question of interference must be decided with reference to 
'time, place, history, and national character' (SRL, p. 33). 
Individual interests were in all cases to be balanced against the 
general good, a consideration which in 1876 is said to require 'the 
nicest discrimination' 'to show what the Government should do, and 
what it should leave to individuals to do' (PE, 1876, p. 206). Although 
15 For further evidence of Jevons's concern with poverty and the link with over· 
population, as well as his,.. policy recommendations to alleviate these problems, see S. 
Peart, 'The Population Mechanism in W. S. Jevons's Applied Economics', Manchester 
School, lviii (1990), 46-9. 'The Rationale of Free Public Libraries' reveals a continuing 
interest in the alleviation of poverty (MSR, 1880). 
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he was always willing to concede the exceptional case to the contrary, 
Jevons retained a presumption in favour of private provision of 
services throughout his career.16 In 1867 his 'strong opinion' was that 
while the public provision of some services, yields 'most indisputable 
advantages', 'private commercial enterprise and responsibility have 
still more unquestionable advantages' (MSR; p. ·278). In 1875 he argued 
that 'free trade and free competition both of employers and workmen is 
the true thing' (Papers and Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons, 
ed. R. D. Collison Black, 7 vols., London, 1972-81, "'vi. 79). Four years 
later he reiterated that the 'presumption is always against a State 
department', although 'in any particular kind of work there may be 
special conditions which render the unity and.. monopoly of Gov-
ernment control desirable and profitable' (MSR, 1879, p. 338). He 
suggested in 1882 that 'the present social arrangements have the 
considerable presumption in their favour that they can at least exist, 
and they can be tolerated' (SRL, p. 12). Thus a 'heavy burden of proof' 
was placed upon the 'advocate of social change which has not or 
cannot be tested previously on a small scale'. And, as we will see below, 
the specific reforms that Jevons advocated placed emphasis upon 
private provision, as well as local control, of the proposed services. 
III 
,Jevons's major works on economic policy, The State in Relation to 
Labour, and Methods of Social' Reform, reveal his concern with ameli-
orating working class conditions. "Throughout we find evidence of a 
wide-ranging reform programme designed to encourage self-improve-
ment on the part of the labouring classes. 
The presumption in favour of liberty is evident throughout Jevons's 
analysis of trade unions. Here he argued that 'anything ... which tends 
to interfere with the exercise by any person of the utmost amount 'Of 
skill of which he is capable, is prima facie opposed to the interests of 
the community' (SRL, p. 99); but he conceded that there may be 
'counterbalancing advantages', in which case the trade union might be 
sanctioned, provided it be 'fully justified and carefully regulated by the 
State' to ensure that its 'raison d'etre must be the good of the people 
outside, not of the privileged few inside the monopoly'. Failing this, it 
should 'be either reformed or destroyed'. 
The State might also justifiably restrict· liberty when 'the expert is a 
16 Compare Paul, who has argued that Jevons's exhortations concerning laissez-faire 
amounted to 'empty and formalistic obeisance', whose effect was 'rendered nugatory' (p. 
278; cf. p. 283), and also that Jevons was less individualistic than Mill and stripped 
Utilitarianism of a 'presumption in favor of liberty' (pp. 279--80). 
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far better judge than the individual purchaser', and 'ignorant people 
cannot take precautions against dangers of which they are ignorant', a 
case described in 1882: 
While it is a fact that people live in badly-drained houses, drink sewage water, 
purchase bad meat or adulterated groceries, it is of no use urging that their 
interests would lead them not to do so. The fact demolishes any amount of 
presumption and argument (pp. 42-3). 
More strongly, such action is said actually to give effect to people's 
desires, and thereby to ensure the existence ofliberty: the 'Government 
officer who steps in and prevents the faulty article from being exposed 
to sale does not really restrict the liberty of the purchaser ... [but]· 
actually assists the purchaser in carrying out his own desires' (p, 43). 
On similar grounds Jevons recommended that mothers of young 
children be restricted from working in factories, a policy which is said 
to ensure that the interests and liberty of children were protected 
(MSR, 1882, pp. 156-79). 
Jevons praised the 1834 Poor Law for its emphasis on local control of 
poor law policy, and called for the creation of 'a strong executive 
commission framed somewhat on the lines of the Poor Law Commis-
sion' to authorize and supervise plans 'proposed by local authorities' in 
the Liquor Trade; successful plans would 'by degrees' be adopted in 
other locales (MSR, 1880, p. 271). This method is said to have been used 
in 'all the more successful legislative and administrative reforms of 
later years' (p. 266), including incremental steps towards regulating 
factory hours. The issue was 'not to be decided once for all on some 
supposed principle of liberty', because 'where a large number of men 
are employed together in a factory there is not the same,individual 
liberty' (SRL, p. 65). The 1878 Factory Act thus received praise for 'the 
several more tentative acts by which this was preceded' as well as 'the 
thorough inquiries of the Factory Act Commissioners of 1875' (p. 52). 
But Jevons supplemented this endorsement of incrementalism (and 
careful inquiry), and recommended experimental legislation in the 
punishment of debtors, sanitary regulations, and the London Water 
Supply (MSR, 1S80, pp. 265, 273f).17 
In Jevons's treatment of taxation we find evidence of his desire to 
make a (synthetical) utilitarian estimate of the benefits and costs of 
specific taxes in order to impose 'theoretically' sound taxes (PE, 1871, 
p. 211). The 1875 lecture on taxation outlined 'four ["classical"] 
maxims of taxation which Adam Smith laid down as the qualities 
17 In W. Mays' evaluation: 'Whenever possible, Jevons believes, legislation should 
observe the order of nature and proceed tentatively', a type of experimentation which 
resembles 'that involved in habit· learning'. See 'Jevons's Conception of Scientific 
Method', Manchester School, xxx (1962), 243. 
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proper in a tax' (Papers and Correspondence, vi. 135).18 The first, 
proportionate taxation, was said to be 'a doubtful proposition theoreti-
cally' requiring examination 'from many sides'. Since proportionate 
taxation 'only bears a very small real proportion to [the rich man's] 
total income compared with the proportion which the poor man's 
taxation bears to his', it imposed relatively more suffering on the poor 
than the rich and was not 'fair' .19 
Jevons raised several objections, however, to progressive taxation. 
He argued, first, that if the poor were exempt from taxation a situation 
would result where 99% of the population taxed the 100th% (p. 136).20 
Secondly, relatively high tax rates on the rich were said to create 
adverse incentive effects for capital accumulation with a negative 
impact on the rate of 'progress'. On balance Smith's proportionate 
scheme was most reasonable. Most interesting and subtle, exemption 
and proportionate taxation were regarded as means of inculcating 
responsibility among citizens. No class other than those who were 
'actually paupers' was to be exempt from taxation, and taxation was to 
be 'coincident with representation': 
We must carefully guard against imposing upon the very poor any charge 
disproportionate to their income, and from those who are actually paupers we 
cannot really take anything. But if representation is to be coincident with 
taxation, then taxation must be coincident with representation. We may strive 
privately to alleviate the extreme differences between the incomes of the poor 
and the rich, but to allow any exemption from the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship would be a concession ultimately fatal to the welfare of all (PE, 
1871, p. 239). 
Jevons evaluated a broad range of policies in the light of their 
perceived abilities to improve the 'general low tone' of the labouring 
classes. The notion that education was of paramount importance to the 
economic and intellectual independence of the working classes, and a 
necessary preliminary to resolution of problems associated with over-
population, prompted him to call for its public provision.21 
Once the 'education question was put in a way of fair solution', 
Jevons enlarged his vision of education to entail a remarkably broad 
18 These are equality, certainty, convenience, and economy. While Jevons's debt to 
Smith is here formally acknowledged, he was clearly working within the same frame· 
work as Mill. See Principles of Political Economy, ed. J.M. Robson, 2 vols., Toronto, 1965 
(Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vols. ii and iii), iii. 805. 
19 The argument relied upon diminishing marginal utility of income: 'The general idea 
... was that 10 [pounds) was of more importance to a man whose income was only 100 a 
year than 100 would be to a man whose income is 1,000; and of vastly more importance 
than 1;000 would be to a man whose income was 10,000 a year'. 
20 Exemption, however, is really a separate logical issue. 
21 See Jevons's remarks of 3 Nov. 1866: 'I hope to see every child educated, and every 
exception to the equality of classes before the laws of justice removed' (Papers and 
Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons, iii. 138). For further evidence, see Peart, pp. 
46f. 
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programme of cultural activity (MSR, 1878, p. 26). Since the 'vulgarity' 
of the working classes was due in part to the suppression of amuse-
ments 'by a dominant aristocracy', improvement of 'the low state of 
musical education' was a means to 'a higher civilization' (pp. 6, 7, 11). 
He recommended the provision of outdoor concerts by volunteer and 
unpaid musicians, it being the duty of the upper classes to frequent the 
concerts in order to spread their popularity (pp. 13, 24). This would 
result in an 'enormous increase of utility ... acquired for the com-
munity at a trifling cost' (pp. 28-9); minimal state interference, and 
local variation, were involved. Public libraries, also, were recom-
mended as a low-cost means of broadening the education of the 
working classes, provided they entailed local direction and a minimum 
of government agency (1881, pp. 28-52). And Jevons objected to large 
public museums on the grounds that they were an ineffective educative 
tool; he regarded local collections of geological artefacts as more 
effective (1881-2, pp. 55-6, 62). 
IV 
M. White has argued that Jevons's work on labour issues was designed 
to support the status quo. The evidence given below relating to the 
analyses of trade unions and co-operation reinforces the notion that 
Jevons favoured incremental social change.22 
Confining the analysis within a partial-equilibrium setting, Jevons 
argued in 1868 and 1882 that labour supply restrictions within particu-
lar trades resulted in artificially high wages and prices in the affected 
industries: 'Each trade which maintains a strict union' endeavours 'to 
secure an unfair share of the public expenditures' (SRL, p. 106; cf. 
MSR, 1868, pp. 111-12). This 'private taxation' was said to be borne by 
consumers, who were, for the ~ost part, labourers (pp. 104, 106).23 
Further, since those 'who most need combination to better their 
fortunes are just those who are the least able to carry it out', unions 
exacerbated distributive injustices. Jevons concluded 
Though workmen, in respect of belonging to the same social class, may try to 
persuade themselves that their interests are identical, this is not really the 
case. They are and must be competitors, and every rise of wages which one 
body secures by more exclusive combination represents a certain amount, 
sometimes a large amount, of injury to the other bodies of workmen ... success 
22 
-On this matter see M. White, 'The Restoration of "Supply and Demand": The 
Production of Jevons's Theory of Political Economy', Paper presented at the 11th 
Conference of Economists, Flinders University of South Australia (1982), p. 37, and 
Black, 'Jevons' in The New Palgrave, ii. 1013. 
23 Labour supply restrictions in the building trades were 'particularly injurious', since 
'The general effect is to make really wholesome houses a luxury for the wealthier classes, 
while the residuum have to herd together between whatever walls they can find' (SRL, 
pp. 104-5). 
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in maintaining exclusive monopolies leads to great loss and injury to the 
community in general (p. 104). 
Trade unions also created technical inefficiencies, since workers 
resisted the introduction of cost-reducing innovations (MSR, 1870, 
p. 126).24 
Notwithstanding his disapproval of restrictive union attempts to 
raise wages, Jevons allowed in 1868 that trade unions performed an 
educative function: 'some kind of association' being 'indispensable to 
the progress and amelioration of the largest and in some respects the 
most important class of our population', and 'one of the best proofs of 
the innate capacity for self-government which I believe we all possess' 
(MSR, 1868, pp. 102, 103; cf. MSR, 1870, p. 123). Unions"Were also said to 
enable the labourer to guard his 'health, convenience, comfort, and 
safety' (p. 108). 
Because trade unionism encouraged self-reliant behaviour, and 
since experience revealed that legislation to restrict trade union 
activity would 'suppress with much evil many germs of good', Jevons 
recommended in 1882 that the legislature 'finally' relinquish 'its 
jealousy of associative action' (SRL, pp. 109, 114-15).25 He insisted, 
however, that the 'imperative needs' of society be met, and favoured 
the establishment of an authority to ensure that 'in the last resort' 
duties such as the stoking of gas retorts be performed in the event of a 
strike. Finally, Jevons favoured voluntary union membership. 
But all this was second best. As a solution to the labour problem 
Jevons preferred 'one more useful and beneficial form of organisation', 
which he referred to interchangeably as co-operation and partnership 
(MSR, 1870, pp. 122-3), an arrangement whereby labourers would 
contribute 'on a small scale' to the 'sinking fund', and receive their 
usual wage payments as well as some share of profits. (Profits in this 
context are treated as a return to investment, plus a residual which 
varies from year to year depending on the realized output price.)26 
In 1866 Jevons wrote an impassioned plea to the Manchester City 
News: 
I hope to see the time when workmen will be to a great extent their own 
capitalists .... I believe that a movement of workmen towards co-operation in 
the raising of capital would be anticipated by employers admitting their men to 
a considerable share of their profits (Papers and Correspondence, iii. 138). 
24 On only two occasions did Jevons look at the general case, and he concluded that 
general wage increases were unattainable. See MSR (1868), pp. 113-14, and SRL, p. 106. 
25 This was a reluctant endorsement. Jevons insisted throughout his career that all 
labourers (including unions) should recognize that their interests were aligned with 
producers, and never endorsed union attempts to raise wages. 
26 There are problems reconciling the formulation with Jevons's TPE. See H. Stewart, 
'Jevons on Profit-Sharing: Atomistic Theory. versus Social Policy', Paper presented to 
the HES annual meetings, Charlottesville, 1989. 
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Co-operation, which divided the produce of labour 'as it has always 
been re~ogriized by political economists-the wages of labour, the 
interest of capital, the wages of superintendence, the compensation for 
risk in the sinking fund, and the extra profits of successful years', is 
said to implement 'the great vivifying principle of political economy-
that reward should be in proportion to desert'. 27 Its advantages are said 
to include the increased 'diligence' of workers as a result of their 
interest in the enterprise, a decline of discontent among the labourers 
who share in the enterprise's concerns, increased savings of labourers, 
fewer strikes and the decline of the notion that incomes should be 
equal (ibid., 153). In 1870, Jevons reiterated that partnership would 
'efface in some degree the line which now divides employers and 
employed' (MSR, 1870, p. 148). Again he anticipated increased ef-
ficiency since workers would gain a 'direct interest in the work done'. 
There would also be a role for competition, an 'honourable rivalry' 
among firms (p. 142). 
Most importantly, partnership would correct the 'one great defect of 
character' of the working class- 'the want of thrift and providence' 
(pp. 144, 145). Labourers who received a lump sum bonus in yearly 
dividends would begin 'to look beyond the week' and become indepen-
dent; thus co-operation would stimulate self-reliant behaviour and 
'millions may be ultimately raised above the chance of pauperism' (pp. 
146, 148). 'It is only in becoming small capitalists', Jevons wrote, 'that 
the working-classes will acquire the real independence from misfor-
tune, which is their true and legitimate rule' (p. 146).28 • 
In 1882 Jevons specified his notion of partnership more fully. Here he 
described a system involving payment of'subsistence' weekly wages 'to 
enable the labourer and his family to await the completion of the 
interval between manufacture and sale', and in addition, a 'share of all 
surplus profits' (SRL, pp. 142, 143).29 Again he stressed that this 
arrangement would reduce industrial strife (p. 145). 
It is significant that there is little distinction between partnership 
and co-operation in Jevons's 1866 work; and apparently in conse-
quence of perceived· wealth constraints precluding workers from gath-
ering the requisite capital together, from 1870 ,he favoured industrial 
partnership which in 1875 he defined as the 'truest form of co-
operation' (Papers and Correspondence, vi. 77; cf. iii. 153; MSR, 1870, p. 
27 Letter to The Times, 19 Jan. 1867, Papers and Correspondence, iii. 152. This is the 
justification of'all the laws of property, and ... their only sufficient warrant' (p. 152; cf. p. 
132). 
28 Partnership would lead to 'peace', 'steady, zealous work', mutual 'confidence and 
esteem', and less 'drunkenness', 'fighting', 'swearing', and 'gambling' (p. 130). 
29 Jevons also considered the alternatives of conciliation and arbitration here and 
argued in favour of arbitration for settlement of past disputes, and conciliation for 
disputes concerning the 'future rate of wages' (SRL, pp. 145, 152). 
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141). He did not proceed as far in this matter as Mill, who distinguished 
carefully between partnership and co-operation, and preferred the 
latter. 
With the foregoing in mind we can turn to White's evaluation that 
despite his criticism of the wage-fund theory, Jevons arrived at its 
'most doctrinaire' conclusions reinforcing 'iron laws' of income distri-
bution. This interpretation is unconvincing, though Jevons did main-
tain that the achievement of a general wage increase through union 
activity was not feasible. Apart from his recognition that union 
activity could alter the distribution of income across trades by altering 
the structure of wages, there is the fundamentally important role 
accorded partnership and co-operation, which, by enabling labourers 
to become ('small') capitalists, could most certainly alter the distribu-
tion of income, and allow labourers to become self-reliant. Modifica-
tion of existing institutions constituted a powerful means of social 
reform. 
v 
In his Essay on method Mill stressed, as Jevons was later to do, that the 
policy analyst must synthesize the scientific knowledge of many 
disciplines: 
He must analyze the existing state of society into its elements, not dropping 
and losing any of them by the way. After referring to the experience of 
individual man to learn the law of each of these elements ... and how much of 
the effect follows from so much of the cause when not counteracted by any 
other cause, there remains an operation of synthesis; to put all the effects 
together ... to collect what would be the effect of all the causes acting at once 
(CW, iv. 336).30 
Since these operations are 'performed only with a certain approxima-
tion to correctness', the synthesis is tentative: 'mankind can never 
predict with absolute certainty, but only with a less or greater degree 
of probability'. 
Mill argued that legislation was not itself a science, although it 
relied upon a number of scientific endeavours: 'Legislation is making 
laws. We do not talk ofthe science of making anything' (p. 321). In the 
'art' of legislation, he insisted that rules and exceptions were normal, 
there being no universally valid policy prescriptions: 'If, in the major-
ity of cases ["a certain thing"] is fit to be done, that is made the rule. 
When a case subsequently occurs in which the thing ought not to be 
done, an entirely new leaf is turned over' (p. 339). In this respect, 
Jevons's method was entirely at one with Mill's. 
30 All references in the text to Mill's work are from the Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, vols. i-v, x, xiv, xviii and xix; they include CW, j;he 
volume number, and page. 
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'Practical' and experiential knowledge-'extensive personal ex-
perience' -was, for MiU, indispensable to the legislator (p. 333). In the 
1851 'London Water SuJ?ply', he reiterated that the imposition of any 
particular policy involved 'matters of fact' and not 'principle' (CW, v. 
437). Further, he fully appreciated the difficulties which Jevons later 
stressed, of designing experiments and interpreting evidence, and he 
cautioned against wide-ranging inference based upon observation. 
Thus the experience of one country could not be applied to another in a 
simple-minded fashion, and legislators could not infer that institutions 
which suited English 'opinions, feelings, and historical antecedents', 
suited Ireland (CW, vi. 511-12; cf. iv. 328-9).31 Because of the problems 
associated with multiple causation, observations required careful 
interpretation (CW, iv. 328-9; ii. 145). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Mill wrote enthusiastically about 
experimental attempts to evaluate the relative merits of various forms 
of social organization, and argued in Principles of Political Economy 
that these experiments should be actively 'encouraged': 'Every [1848: 
Socialism, Communism, every] theory of social improvement, the 
worth of which is capable of being brought to an experimental test, 
should be permitted, and even encouraged, to submit itself to that test' 
(CW, iii. 903). The passages on European Associations in the 1852 
edition provide further evidence of this appreciation of 'noble' social 
experiments (cf. pp. 769-91; 903-4).32 The Chapters on Socialism also 
called for trials on an 'experimental scale' (CW, v. 736). In this 
appreciation of experiential method, we have seen, Mill anticipated 
Jevons. 
For Mill, the unifying principle of public policy was, of course, the 
greatest good of the greatest number, but he was much concerned with 
the precise nature of the general rule. After his self-described emo-
tional crisis, he reformulated the goal, rejecting what he originally 
(mistakenly) perceived to be Bentham's excessively narrow definition 
(cf. CW, i. 99-100).33 Because he stressed man's spiritual nature, he 
argued that material gain was not the ultimate goal for society. A 
moral tone, and a wide notion of 'improvement', were therefore inte-
grated into the utilitarian goal; 'utility', he maintained, constitutes 
31 Jevons criticized Mill's calls for 'a vast revolution in the land-owning of Ireland', 
and favoured a 'small progressive experiment' instead-a position which supports my 
contention that Jevons was prone to be less interventionist than Mill (sse note 6 above). 
In 1882 Jevons favoured the Irish Land Act; see SRL, p. 8. 
32 See the remarks from Essays on Economics and Society, ed. J.M. Robson, 2 vols., 
Toronto, 1967 (CW, vols. iv and v), v. 618: 'Since trial alone can decide whether any 
particular experiment is successful, latitude should be given for carrying <' l the 
experiment until the trial is complete.' 
33 For a full discussion of Mill's vacillations regarding utility, see S. Hollander, The 
Economics of John Stuart Mill, Oxford, 1985, pp. 602f. The author demonstrates that 
Mill's utilitarian position, according a prominent role to individual liberty, was in fact 
consistent with Bentham's original position. 
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'the ultimate source of moral obligations' (CW, x. 226). This perspective 
had major implications for economic policy, which at the least, Mill 
argued, was to suit, and at best might improve, the moral character of 
the public. Thus Mill occasionally questioned the effectiveness of 
institutional reforms which did not aim at moral improvement and 
would consequently not achieve lasting effects. 34 
The greatest-happiness notion remained nonetheless problematic, 
since Mill was never able to provide a clear cut means of ranking, or 
evaluating, pleasures. In Utilitarianism, he resorted to 'competent 
judges' who were to perform the difficult task of 'valuing' the quality of 
pleasures (CW, x. 213; cf. pp. 211-12).35 Just as Jevons allowed that we 
'might not agree on our utilitarian estimates', so, also, Mill realized 
that even competent judges might not agree on the ranking. 
Since for Mill as well as Jevons the moral, economic and intellectual 
independence of each, is integral to 'happiness', he placed conspicuous 
emphasis on 'liberty' as a component in the utilitarian goal. This is a 
carefully specified liberty pertaining to 'self-regarding' actions, and is 
regarded as a human need, requisite to attaining happiness: 'Where, 
not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other 
people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal 
ingredients of human happinessi and quite the chief ingredient of 
individual and social progress.'36 Mill stressed that specific reforms 
should be encouraged but not imposed, and preferred local to central 
control of reforms on the grounds that this preserved liberty; his praise 
for the Poor Law ran along precisely these lines.37 In these respects, he 
was at one with Jevons. 
On Llberty provides the methodological framework for approaching 
specific economic policies. In instances of 'social acts', there was no 
doubt that intervention, affecting 'that part of conduct which society is 
competent to restrain', was admissible (CW, xviii. 293; cf. iii. 803-4). 
Each instance required examination to determine whether interven-
tion was warranted; if unimpeded action led to undesirable results, this 
behaviour could be restricted. Mill argued that laws preventing fraud, 
34 See Mill, The Later Letters 1849-1873, ed. F. E. Mineka and D. N. Lindley, Toronto, 4 
vols., Toronto, 1972 (CW, vols. xiv-xvii), xiv. 45, and Essays on Economics, CW, iv. 375. 
35 The moralist like Mill who attempts to allow for (and encourage) human improve· 
ment, may not accept that pleasures which attract more people are those which should be 
ranked most highly. Consequently Mill sought an alternative means of ranking pleas-
ures. See Stephen, iii. 304f. This problem also plagued Jevons. 
"' Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. by J.M. Robson, Toronto, 2 vols., 1977 
(CW, vols. xviii and xix), xviii. 261. See the discussion in J.M. Robson:' ... Mill argues 
that social ends cannot be understood, much less achieved, except by individuals'; the 
individual 'must be free to choose his own destiny in the light of his moral views-
consideration always being given to the happiness and equal development of others' (The 
Improvement of Mankind, Toronto, 1968, p. 127; cf. pp. 124--7). 
37 Essays on Ethics, CW, xix. 606---7. Thus for example, State-funded education should 
be available to all, but not compulsory. See The Later Letters, CW, xiv. 89. 
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and sanitary and safety regulations, were justified on this basis (pp. 
292-3; cf. x. 197-8). Trade itself was a 'social act' falling 'within the 
jurisdiction of society'. If free trade did not ensure cheap and good 
quality products, intervention was required. Jevons's position on this 
justification for intervention was fully anticipated by Mill. 
Mill argued for intervention in cases where forces distorted competi-
tion (as in, for example, the Endowments question) (CW, v. 625; cf. 433, 
vi. 502). Monopoly rights granted by the State should also be regu-
lated-a justification which we have seen Jevons relied upon in his 
analysis of the trade union. In the face of a conflict of interests in 
society, there might be further scope for intervention. Most important 
is the provision of educational services, Mill arguing that, since the 
interests of parents clashed potentially with those of children, inter-
vention was justified-an argument which Jevons extended to restrict-
ive legislation regarding working mothers. 
Mill also urged the public provision of special services, which would 
not be 'adequately' supplied by competitive forces:· 'anything which it 
is desirable should be done for the general interests of mankind or of 
future generations', 'but which is not of a nature to remunerate 
individuals or associations for undertaking it' being deemed 'a suitable 
thing to be undertaken by the government' (CW, iii. 970). Jevons also, 
we have seen, urged the provision of public services (such as libraries) 
based upon a similar justification. 
In the general conception of the utilitarian goal, Mill anticipated 
Jevons. But what of Mill's analysis of trade unions? Since Jevons was 
highly critical of the wage-fund and inverse wage-profit theories, one 
might expect their positions on trade unions to differ. In fact, they do 
'not, and this requires explanation. 
In Thornton on Labour and Its Claims (1869), Mill referred to 'a view 
of the question of wage increases', reportedly a 'common opinion' that 
wage increases might be financed by increased prices (CW, v. 660). 
While acknowledging that 'in single trades' a wage increase would be 
followed by an increased price, Mill insisted, following Ricardian 
principles, that an across-the-board increase would leave the level of 
prices unaffected: 'though a rise of wages in a given trade may be 
compensated to the masters by a rise of the price of their commodity, a 
rise of general wages cannot be compensated to employers generally by 
a general rise of prices' (pp. 600-1; cf. p. 661).38 
But the partial case was ~he only one of practical significance. There 
a rise would be 'a gain made, wholly or in part, at the expense of the 
38 
'A rise of wages, thus confined to particular employments, is not (like a rise of 
general wages) defrayed from profits, but raises the value and price of the particular 
article, and falls on the consumer' (Principles, CW, iii. 930). 
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remainder of the labouring classes'. Consequently, for Mill union-
ization entailed a 'serious question of right and wrong, as between 
Unionists and the remainder of the labouring classes' (p. 662). While 
labourers had 'no obligations but those of prudence' towards their 
employers, who at any rate were 'quite capable of taking care of 
themselves', they did 'owe moral duties to the remainder of the 
labouring classes' and 'to the community at large'. This is precisely 
Jevons's position. To this Mill added the censure that Jevons later 
raised: unions created inefficiencies by resisting technological innova-
tions (p. 665). 
Restrictive trade unions were, however, justified in the face of 
overwhelming population growth on the part of unskilled workers: 
if the present state of the general habits of the people were to remain for ever 
unimproved, these partial combinations, in so far as they do succeed in keeping 
up the wages of any trade by limiting its numbers might be looked upon as 
simply intrenching round a particular spot against the inroads of overpopula-
tion, and making their wages depend upon their own rate of increase, instead 
of depending on that of a more reckless and improvident class than themselves 
(CW, ii. 397).39 
Further, the attainment of high general wages should 'be welcomed 
and rejoiced at' (CW, iii. 929; cf. p. 930). Most importantly, 'the right of 
making the attempt' to raise wages was a matter of justice, and n'6t to 
be denied. In short, 'the improvement and elevation of the working 
classes' through 'the liberty of association' was championed (p. 903). 
Like Jevons, however, Mill insisted that unions be voluntary. 
Yet Mill favoured an alternative to capitalism, which would pro-
perly reward personal initiative, encourage the achievement of inde-
pendence by labourers, and reduce class conflict (CW, ii. 207).40 
Co-operation, the ownership of enterprises with labourers working 
under managers 'elected and removable by themselves', was said to put 
an end to the dependence of labourers, making them 'in some sort, a 
partner' in the enterprise (CW, iv. 382). Mill anticipated efficiency 
advantages of co-operation, since workers would gain a direct interest 
in the productive process, creating a 'vast stimulous to productive 
energies' (CW, iii. 792). And like Jevons, Mill argued that co-operation 
39 Mill however, foresaw a time when, population growth having declined, this 
restriction would no longer be necessary. Once he perceived a lessening of the pressure 
of population growth, he became more reluctant to endorse the union's restriction of 
labour supply. See the account in Hollander, The Economics of Mill, pp. 897f. For 
evidence that Jevons shared these concerns, see below. 
40 Mill wanted equal opportunities, and reward according to initiative; he objected to 
the division of the produce only slightly connected 'with merit and demerit, or even with 
exertion and want of exertion in the individual' (Essays on Economics, CW, v. 444; cf. 
Principles, CW, iii. 769). But see P. Schwartz, The New Political Economy of J. S. Mill, 
London, 1972, p. 197. 
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offered due reward for abilities and exertions, and yet promised the end 
of the clash of interests between employers and employed (p. 768; cf. 
CW, iv. 382). 
Mill insisted that co-operative ventures be voluntary and practic-
able. In 1848 and,1849, when partnership laws made true co-operation 
difficult to attain, he focused on profit-sharing and partnership as 
practical means of reform, 'obtaining the benefits of co-operation, 
without constituting the numerical majority of the co-operators an 
inferior caste' (CW, iii. 1013; cf. p. 1007; iv. 385-6). These were second 
best, however, to true co-operation which would, in contrast to 
Jevons's recommendation, entirely (not 'in som~ degree'), efface the 
capital-labour distinction. There is, then, some merit to White's evalu-
ation if we understand his claim to signifiy that Jevons was less radical 
than Mill.41 
Jevons's analysis of taxation added the explicit theoretical notion of 
diminishing marginal utility to Mill's analysis of this issue>-For while 
Mill allowed that proportionate taxation imposed a burden on the poor 
'incommensurable' with that of the rich, this was envisaged as a 
contrast between the very poor and the rest of the population (CW, iii. 
809). In his mind the key distinction was between incomes that enabled 
the consumption of only necessaries-the taxation of which imposed 
an unjustifiably large burden-and incomes that yielded a surplus 
spent on luxuries. The distinction between 'comforts' and 'luxuries' 
was not granted (cf. CW, xv. 976). There is, however, evidence that Mill 
favoured redistributive policies based on a version of the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility. 42 
It must be recalled, too, that for Jevons diminishing marginal utility 
considerations were overruled by classical concerns as an argument 
for progression. Mill shared these concerns; on humanitarian grounds 
he called for exemption of a minimum income (CW, iii. 831), and argued 
that taxing high (earned) incomes progressively would punish initi-
ative and create incentives problems (p. 810).43 He also allowed that 
unearned income might be taxed progressively, with no adverse incent-
ives effects (pp. 819-20), a point which Jevons did not address. 
41 See above, note 6. Mill went beyond Jevons also in recommending compensation for 
losses incurred due to intervention. For evidence that the utility principle entailed some 
right to compensation, see Principles, CW, ii. 233. 
'
2 See Principles, CW, ii. 225-6, and Hollander, The Economics of Mill, pp. 880-1. This is 
further evidence that Mill went beyond Jevons. 
'
3 Income was to be taxed 'only in proportion to the surplus by which they exceed the 
limit' -allowing some amount of progression (Principles, CW, iii. 831). 
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VI 
I have demarcated a remarkable similarity between the policy analyses 
of Mill and Jevons. My final task now is to ascertain whether Jevons 
appreciated and acknowledged this near identity with Mill. 
Jevons's earliest remarks concerning Mill's theory of public policy 
reveal a deep appreciation for Mill's notion of liberty. In 1866 he wrote, 
'For my part I wish to see cherished and developed in England such 
liberalism as Mr. Mill has deliberately described in his brief but great 
essay on liberty" (to the Manchester Examiner and Times, 22 Oct. 
Papers and Correspondence, iii. 132). His lecture delivered at Owens 
College the same year, on 'The Importance of Diffusing a Knowledge of 
Political Economy', reiterated that 
By liberty I do nQt mean merely what is vulgarly regarded as liberty by many, 
the privilege to vote for a representative in Parliament. I mean what Mr. Mill 
upholds as true liberty, in that noble essay which is perhaps the best of his 
great works (ibid., vii. 42). 
Jevons also recognized Mill's precedence regarding the criteria for 
the provision of public services. In the 1875 Lectures this is said to 
involve in each case 'Mill's result', a comparison of relative public and 
private advantages. Jevons reiterated Mill's distinction between 
'necessary and optional' functions of government, the latter being 
provided when 'the public utility of these things is exceedingly obvious 
and when it is plain that they can be more cheaply and effectively done 
by a single agency'. In short, 
The truth on this subject I should say is that there is no general principle, 
except that of adding up the comparative advantages in each particular case, 
ie. you must make the best observation you can of the results of experiments 
one way or the other. 
The Manchester Omnibus Company ought to be in the hands of the local 
government. 
What I have stated is Mill's result (ibid., vi. 133). 
In 1882 Jevons cited Mill's remarks from the Principles in a passage 
which is enlightening, since it reveals agreement with Mill's recom-
mendations that labourers recognize their common interests, and also 
a common concern about the population issue: 
J. S. Mill, after expressing some opinions in which I cannot coincide, has added 
the following striking passage, which cannot be too much read:- ' ... partial 
combinations ... might be looked upon as simply intrenching round a particu-
lar spot against the inroads of overpopulation, and making their wages depend 
upon their own rate of increase, instead of depending on that of a more reckless 
and improvident class than themselves. The time, however, is past when the 
friends of human improvement can look with complacency on the attempts of 
small sections of the community, whether belonging to the labouring or any 
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other class, to organize a separate class interest in antagonism to the general 
body of labourers' (SRL, pp. 108-9).44 
Throughout his career Jevons relied on Mill's authority in the 
disc:µssion of co-operation. In the 1866 plea for partnership Jevons 
added his 'small voice to that of men like Mr. Mill' (Papers and 
Correspondence, iii. 138). An 1867 letter published in The Times sug-
gested that co-operation was 'neither in principle nor in practice' 
'really new', since 'J. S. Mill, in advocating [it] many years ago, ... 
pointed out many instances where labourers share results' (p. 153). The 
1870 lecture 'On Industrial Partnerships', referred to passages in Mill's 
Principles on co-operation. And in 1882 Jevons acknowledged again 
that 'the outlines of the scheme are familiar to all who have read with 
proper care John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy' (SRL, p. 
143). 
At the same time, Jevons was highly critical of Utilitarianism; in the 
1879 review he argued that Mill had 'left the grounds of Paley and 
Bentham' and 'thrown ethical philosophy into confusion'. The primary 
objection was that while pleasures differed qualitatively as Mill 
maintained, Mill had not arrived at the means of ranking pleasures.45 
His notion of 'competent judges' was akin to 'a packed jury', whose 
ranking would amount to the 'verdict which would be given by 
vegetarians in favour of a vegetable diet'. Jevons concluded that 
'Mcill's attempt to reconcile his ideas on the subject with the Utilit-
arian theory hopelessly fails' (pp. 532-3). 
The trouble is that Jevons himself failed to resolve the problems 
associated with ranking pleasures. It is the case that policy analysis, 
for Jevons (and this is also true of Mill), entailed inevitable subjective 
value judgments concerning the nature of the 'pleasures' associated 
with particular policies.46 A Free Library is a worthwhile policy 
because it leads to responsible educated behaviour which is judged to 
be a 'better' outcome than the Race Track result of short term pleasure 
with few educational benefits. Mill and Jevons agreed in their policy 
recommendations because they happened to share similar visions of a 
reformed society-whose citizens were intellectually as well as 
economically independent-and thus broadly speaking in their evalu-
ation of 'pleasures'. 
« Jevons did not specify the 'opinions' of Mill he contested. 
45 
'Mill's Philosophy Tested', pp. 523, 525. Jevons argued in opposition to Mill, that the 
Library was a better policy than the race track, 'not because there is a "Free-Library 
building emotion", which is essentially, better than a "Race-Course-establishing emo-
tion"', but because, having analyzed the effects of each policy in terms of the types of 
pleasure created, the policy maker finds that the Library creates the most pleasure. 
46 See Robbins for the argument that all recommendations of policy entail 'judgments 
of value' and 'conventions' which facilitate interpersonal comparability ('Economics and 
Political Economy', Papers and Proceedings of the AEA, lxxi (1981), 5, 6). 
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At the same time, I have pointed to significant differences between 
Jevons and Mill. First, Jevons failed to consider the possibility of 
compensating those harmed by government policies. This may be a 
reflection of a more pervasive difference: Jevons was in some instances 
less willing than Mill to call for intervention. He objected to Mill's 
calls for wide-ranging land reform in Ireland, and maintained a less 
radical stance on co-operation than Mill. 
VII 
I turn in conclusion to an evaluation of the relationship between 
Jevons's Theory of Political Economy and his analysis of economic ,. 
policy. This issue is important considering on-going debate concerning 
the relevance of Jevons's utility theory to his policy analysis. R. D. C. 
Black has suggested that Jevons placed little faith in economic theory 
as a guide to policy analysis. Similarly, Mark Blaug has argued that 
'when Jevons and Walras wrote on policy questions, as they did, there 
wa& little or no connection between practical recommendations and 
their views on value theory'.47 Yet, as noted at the outset, T. W. 
Hutchison contends that the policy and theory 're- or evolutions' were 
related. 
We have seen that the case of progressive taxation based on the 
marginal utility theory, was not decisive for Jevons. Based on his 
methodological position outlined above, he rejected exclusive reliance 
upon static economic theory. Taxation, like all policy issues, required 
consideration of not only static but also dynamic and social 'probabil-
ities'. Thus proportionate taxation, though not recommended from a 
marginal utility perspective, might still be the preferred tax rule on the 
(classical) theoretical grounds that it reinforced incentives to save, 
and on the social grounds that it served to inculcate responsible 
working class behaviour. More generally, as argued above, prices were 
not sufficient to measure the utilitarian (social) value of any good, or 
policy measure, since 'moral', 'sanitary' and other considerations were 
also entailed. I have demonstrated the close continuity in the policy 
analysis of Mill and Jevons; and attributed that continuity to a basic 
conception of social utility which allowed only a limited role for 
marginal utility and prices. 
What of Hutchison's claim that marginal utility theory precipitated 
a new interest in the issues of poverty, and unemployment? There is no 
evidence of a 'new' interest in the issues of poverty or unemployment in 
Jevons's works. Unemployment was simply not a policy concern for 
47 See Black's remarks in 'William Stanley Jevons 183&-1882', Pioneers of Modern 
Economics, ed. D. P. O'Brien and J. R. Presley, London, 1981, p. 24, and also Blaug, p. 269. 
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Jevons. And my investigation has revealed that his concern with the 
poverty of the labouring classes was in line with that of Mill. 
It is equally clear that Hutchison's evaluation does not do justice to 
the caution and empiricism of Mill, who did not rely upon 'rigid, 
Ricardian deduc~ive absolutism', and whose approach to policy ques-
tions was so similar to that of Jevons. For both policy analysis was at 
best an imprecise 'art' requiring that issues of policy be decided on the 
basis of experiential knowledge.48 
It is important to reiterate here that Jevons in one respect went 
somewhat beyond Mill in the matter of experimental legislation. For 
while Mill urged that voluntary social and economic experiments be 
'encouraged', he did not recommend experimental legislation. This is 
an original contribution by Jevons; yet there is nothing in Mill's 
analysis to suggest that he would have opposed Jevons's recommenda-
tions that legislation proceed tentatively and allow diversity and the 
utmost possible local control. In the light of Mill's own strong commit-
ment to local diversity, one might presume that he would favour the 
1880 recommendations. 
My demonstration of the parallels between Mill and Jevons in the 
design of utilitarian presumptive rules, as well as in specific policy 
recommendations dictated by a shared concern for the working classes, 
suggests that Mill, also, was instrumental in the trend in favour of 
intervention evident in nineteenth-century policy analysis, a fact 
which the secondary literature has apparently failed to appreciate.49 
Indeed the evidence from his later works suggests that Jevons may 
have been more cautious, and more inclined to favour individual 
initiative (as opposed to government agency) than Mill. And in the 
analysis of co-operation, J evons did not proceed as far as Mill. 
Whether a 'transition', a movement towards intervention, occurred 
in Jevons's own thought is a much debated issue. T. W. Hutchison 
concedes that no one of Jevons's works provides conclusive evidence of 
a transition, but in a recent evaluation he contrasts Jevons's early 
(Australian) work with SRL and concludes that 1870 marks a personal 
'turning point' for Jevons.50 Yet there are many instances of continuity 
in Jevons's thought. It may be helpful to review these instances, which 
apply to Jevons's position concerning not only particular issues, but 
48 Indeed, Paul has minimized Jevons's contribution by suggesting that he 'endorsed 
Mill's fondness for attempting social experiments on a small scale' (p. 278). 
•• There are, however, some exceptions. See, for instance, Schwartz, as well as 
Hollander, The Economics of Mill. 
60 See Hutchison's position in On Revolutions, p. 97. R. Backhouse reiterates this, as 
well as many of Hutchison's arguments concerning the (post 1870) changing attitudes of 
economists towards state intervention and poverty (A History of Modern Economic 
Analysis, Oxford, 1985, pp. 75, 241--B). Hutch,ison concludes that 1870 marks a turning 
point in 'The Politics and Philosophy', p. 376. 
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also the principles of public policy. He reiterated his 1867 views 
regarding the basis for government intervention in 1880 and 1882. In 
1871, 1880 and 1882 he cautioned that government reforms must take 
into account the state of popular opinion. In 1863, 1870 and 1878 Jevons 
insisted that poverty and vice must be alleviated. He upheld the 
principle of individual liberty from 1866 on. And he retained his 1868 
view regarding trade unions and co-operation through 1882.51 
Further, the evidence from two works written very late in Jevons's 
career, reveal a presumption against intervention. Thus while he 
called for specific innovative interventions (new programmes which 
were feasible only once the education question was 'cleared up'), these 
at the same time entailed little direct government action, and Jevons 
retained a presumption in favour of competition, markets, and non-
interference with (orderly) social progress. 
There is a further relevant matter if we are to maintain an accurate 
perspective. While Mill and Jevons appreciated the need for interven-
tion to help the labouring classes, both retained a firm commitment to 
'self-reliance'. And both believed that policy should be used to create 
self-reliant citizens. Intervention might be required if self-reliant 
action failed to achieve just results, but the long-term aim of policy 
was the eventual achievement of independent and responsible be-
haviour by workers, behaviour which under existing social and eco-
nomic relations was not forthcoming. Thus for both, the utilitarian 
objective encompassed not only purely economic but also social and 
ethical goals-the encouragement of the virtue of self-reliance. 
51 Since he did not write about taxation after 1875, it is difficult to determine whether 
Jevons continued to maintain his position on taxation or not. ' 
